The metaphysical, ethical and theological musings on embryonic stem cells

a response to Peter van Inwagen

  • Fred Olwendo
Keywords: embryonic cells, zygote, virtual objects, potentiality, fertilization, abortion, rights

Abstract

A rather counterintuitive view states that embryonic cells are virtual objects merely adhering to each other, undeserving moral protection until much later. The opposing view states that embryonic cells have/ought to be given complete moral status of human beings’ courtesy of their potentiality. Taken to their logical conclusions, these two positions leave us in unchartered territories that don’t sit well with our basic moral beliefs. Intuitively, most of us believe that while it may be the case the human organism is neither human being nor potential one, however, we also find it counterintuitive when this is taken to suggest that there is nothing going on there that is of moral significance. Still, we have to be careful how much stock we can put on the potentiality argument as it has been the undoing of some. The human organism may have the potential to be a human being. But that does not mean it is a human being, or that it will become one. Potentiality only means the human organism can become a human being or has potential to be one if the right conditions obtain. It is a potentiality that gives us some leverage on the moral protection of embryonic cells but comes with corresponding moral restrictions.

Published
2020-10-02